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Revenue Gaps for Static and Dynamic Posted Pricing
of Homogeneous Goods∗
Paul Du¨tting† Felix Fischer‡ Max Klimm§
Abstract
We consider the problem of maximizing the expected revenue from selling k homogeneous
goods to n unit-demand buyers who arrive sequentially with independent and identically
distributed valuations. In this setting the optimal posted prices are dynamic in the sense
that they depend on the remaining numbers of goods and buyers. We investigate how much
revenue is lost when a single static price is used instead for all buyers and goods, and prove
upper bounds on the ratio between the maximum revenue from dynamic prices and that
from static prices. These bounds are tight for all values of k and n and vary depending on a
regularity property of the underlying distribution. For general distributions we obtain a ratio
of 2 − k/n, for regular distributions a ratio that increases in n and is bounded from above
by 1/(1− kk
ekk!
), which is roughly 1/(1− 1√
2pik
). The lower bounds hold for the revenue gap
between dynamic and static prices. The upper bounds are obtained via an ex-ante relaxation
of the revenue maximization problem, as a consequence the tight bounds of 2 − k/n in the
general case and of 1/(1 − 1√
2pik
) in the regular case apply also to the potentially larger
revenue gap between the optimal incentive-compatible mechanism and the optimal static
price. Our results imply that for regular distributions the benefit of dynamic prices vanishes
while for non-regular distributions dynamic prices may achieve up to twice the revenue of
static prices.
1 Introduction
In the 1820s Irishman Alexander Turney Stewart opened a dry goods store in New York City and
adopted a radical new policy. Rather than negotiating prices individually with each customer,
he offered his goods at fixed prices. While Stewart was raised by Quaker grandparents and
arrived in New York with their introduction letters to American Quakers (Snodgrass, 2011),
we can only speculate whether his decision was based on the Quaker ethic of honesty and
non-preferential treatment as expressed in George Fox’s tract that warned the merchants of
London against using the “cozening and cheating and defrauding” practice of haggling (Fox,
1658; Kent, 1983). Rival retailers predicted that Stewart would be bankrupt within a week.
Instead he became a multi-millionaire, and the A. T. Stewart Dry Goods Store the largest
department store in the world (Resseguie, 1965). More than 150 years later, fixed prices are the
main mechanism for the sale of goods and an important mechanism for the sale of services. For
instance, around 50% of the total consumer expenditure in the US is spent on goods or services
with fixed prices, with vehicles and housing as notable exceptions (Philipps, 2012).
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Fixed-price policies came under scrutiny following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
which removed government control from air transport routes and fares and allowed low-cost
carriers like People Express Airlines to take large profits. Established carriers like the British
Overseas Airways Cooperation and American Airlines reacted by adopting a new type of policy
of capacity-controlled fares where prices depend on the remaining number of seats and the time
until departure (e.g., McAfee and te Velde, 2006). Today dynamic pricing and revenue manage-
ment are considered major success stories in operations research (e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004), and more and more industries adopt ever more sophisticated algorithmic pricing strate-
gies. While originally it was limited mainly to electronic commerce, dynamic pricing is set to
gain traction also in physical retailing, for example through electronic price tags that can be
updated much more quickly than paper price tags.
A potential disadvantage of dynamic prices is that they may be perceived as unfair by
customers. The dual entitlement principle argues that firms are entitled to a fair profit and
customers to a fair price (Kahneman et al., 1986a,b). To determine whether a particular price
is fair customers may refer to price histories and prices charged by competitors (Briesch et al.,
1997), and research has shown that prices paid by other customers in particular have a major
effect on customer satisfaction (Novemsky and Schweitzer, 2004). Customer satisfaction, on the
other hand, is crucial for repeated purchase interactions (Barry and Oliver, 1996). For more
detailed studies on the perceived fairness of yield management we refer to interested reader to
the work of Kambil and Agrawal (2001) and Mauri (2007) and the references therein.
The potential negative effects of dynamic pricing are, at this point, very much a subject of
academic debate and public controversy. The latter is witnessed for example by recent news
items on spikes in surge prices offered by online ridesharing platform Uber on New Year’s Eve
of 2014 (Schupak, 2015) and on online retailer Amazon’s increase of the price of bottled water
in Florida amidst preparations for Hurricane Irma (Popomaronis, 2017). These news items
indicate that customers are becoming increasingly aware and wary of dynamic pricing, and that
there is a tension between the potential for higher revenue achievable through dynamic prices
and a decrease in customer satisfaction that may result from their use. Our point of departure
in this article is the natural question whether the advantages of dynamic pricing outweigh its
disadvantages. We address this question by quantifying precisely the relative loss in revenue
due to a use of static prices instead of dynamic ones.
1.1 Our Contribution
We provide the first formal study of the revenue gap between dynamic and static pricing in a
multiple-goods setting. We focus on the case where k homogeneous goods are sold sequentially
to n unit-demand buyers arriving one at a time. Motivated by situations in which the n buyers
that show up are random draws from a very large population, we focus on the case where buyer
valuations are independently and identically distributed. We note that both the assumption of
identical goods and the assumption of a large population of customers are reasonable for the
industries that pioneered dynamic pricing such as the airline, hotel, and railway industries.
More formally, we assume that we have k homogeneous goods for sale and n buyers arrive
one by one, each of them interested in purchasing a single good and with a valuation drawn
independently of those of the other buyers from a known distribution F . When buyer i arrives
with valuation vi we offer it a price pij that can depend on the number j of goods still available,
on the distribution F , and on i, but not on vi. If vi ≥ pij buyer i purchases the good at price pij,
otherwise it leaves without a purchase. The process continues as long as additional buyers and
goods remain, and we obtain as overall revenue the sum of the prices at which goods have been
sold.
Prices pij for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ k maximizing the expected revenue can be determined
by solving a dynamic program, but they can be very complicated and can in general not be
given in closed form. Instead of dynamic prices as above it may therefore make sense to offer
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Figure 1: Revenue gaps RdF,n,k/R
s
F,n,k for n = 20 buyers (red), n = 50 buyers (green), and
n → ∞ buyers (blue). The results for regular distributions are drawn with solid lines; the
results for arbitrary distributions are dashed. For better illustration, the lines are smooth even
though k only takes integral values.
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Figure 2: Comparison between bounds on the revenue gap RdF,n,k/R
s
F,n,k of dynamic and static
prices obtained in this article and the best bounds from prior work. Numbers in square brackets
indicate lower and upper bounds, a single number means that the bound is tight.
the same static price p to each of the buyers. Static prices are appealing due to their simplicity
and fairness but may lead to a loss in revenue. Our goal here will be to investigate the extent
of this possible loss. Denoting by RdF,n,k and R
s
F,n,k the maximum revenue from dynamic and
static prices when there are n buyers and k goods we will specifically be interested in bounds
on the revenue gap RdF,n,k/R
s
F,n,k. Obviously R
d
F,n,k ≥ RsF,n,k and thus RdF,n,k/RsF,n,k ≥ 1.
1.1.1 Results
We derive tight bounds on the ratio between RdF,n,k and R
s
F,n,k both for general distributions
and the important special case of regular distributions. Regular distributions were introduced
by Myerson (1981) in the context of revenue-maximizing auctions. A distribution is regular if
the revenue R(q) obtained by selling to a single buyer with probability q is concave in q. The
reader may consult Figure 1 for a graphical representation of our results and Figure 2 for a
comparison with bounds from prior work.
For the special case of regular distributions we obtain an upper bound on the revenue gap of
at most k/EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}], where Bin(n, k/n) denotes a binomial distribution with n
trials and success probability k/n. This bound increases in n and tends to 1/(1 − kk
ekk!
) ≈
(1/(1 − 1√
2πk
)). In the single-good case our upper bound simplifies to 1/(1 − (1 − 1n)n) and
3
asymptotically to e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.582, which also follows from an earlier result of Chawla et al.
(2010). Our upper bound is in fact tight for all values of n and k, which we show by optimizing
over a specific family of distributions that are continuous on an interval with additional point
mass on the highest value. A tight result was not previously known even in the single-good
case (Blumrosen and Holenstein, 2008; Hartline, 2017).
Our upper bound of k/EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}] arises from a balls-and-bins analogy for the
setting with a static price. There are two bins, respectively counting buyers who are willing and
unwilling to buy. The price is set in such a way that each buyer is willing to buy with probability
k/n, so that the expected number of buyers willing to buy is equal to EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[X] and
the expected number of items sold to EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}]. The asymptotic bound of
1/(1 − kk
ekk!
) ≈ (1/(1 − 1√
2πk
)) then follows from a standard approximation of the binomial
distribution by the Poisson distribution. Similar asymptotic bounds for related but different
problems were obtained by Alaei (2014) and Chakraborty et al. (2010).1
For general distributions we obtain an upper bound on the revenue gap of 2 − k/n. This
bound is again tight for all values of n and k, which we show by means of a discrete distribution
with support of size two. To our knowledge these are the first bounds on the revenue gap
between static and dynamic prices for irregular distributions and more than one good. For a
single good an asymptotic lower bound of 2 was given by Chawla et al. (2007), and an upper
bound of 2 can be obtained via prophet inequalities (e.g., Hartline, 2017).
The main take-away from our analysis is the qualitatively very different behavior of the
revenue gap as n and k grow large. In many cases of interest RdF,n,k/R
s
F,n,k → 1 for regular
distributions and so static pricing is “first best”, while RdF,n,k/R
s
F,n,k → 2 for irregular distri-
butions and so there is a persistent gap between dynamic and static pricing. Many common
distributions are regular (cf. Ewerhart, 2013), whereas regularity may fail even for very simple
mixtures of regular distributions. For instance the uniform distribution on [0, 1] is regular while
the distribution that draws with probability 4/5 from a uniform distribution on [0, 4] and with
probability 1/5 from a uniform distribution on [4, 10] is not, see Figure 3. This leads to the
following implication for the large population model and large n and k: If the population is
homogeneous, static pricing is optimal. Otherwise, dynamic pricing may be significantly better.
1.1.2 Techniques
The main difficulty in analyzing the revenue gap is the unavailability of closed-form expressions
for the optimal dynamic prices and the corresponding revenue, which holds already for very
simple cases like valuations distributed uniformly on [0, 1] (Gilbert and Mosteller, 1966, § 5a).
We address this difficulty by considering an ex-ante relaxation of the dynamic program char-
acterizing the optimal dynamic prices which relaxes the constraint that at most k goods are
sold to only hold in expectation, and by appealing to and exploiting properties of Bernstein
polynomials in the analysis of the revenue gap between static prices and this relaxation.
We begin our analysis by observing that for independent and identically distributed valua-
tions, the ex-ante relaxation has a symmetric optimum where each buyer obtains a good with
the same probability q∗. In the regular case it then holds that R(q∗) = q∗p∗ for some price
p∗, and we analyze the revenue gap between the ex-ante relaxation and the static price p∗.
Our main idea in this context is to write the revenue generated by the static price p∗ as the
Bernstein polynomial of a monotone and concave function. By using that the approximation
1Alaei (2014) studies posted-price mechanisms for revenue maximization in a setting with k homogeneous
goods and n unit-demand buyers whose values are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The
mechanisms considered by Alaei allow individual buyers to be skipped, which cannot be implemented with a
single static price. For the same setting, Chakraborty et al. (2010) investigate the revenue gap between pricing
policies that may change the order in which buyers are seen after some of the buyers have arrived and pricing
policies that use a fixed ordering. Since even their fixed-ordering policies may offer different prices to different
buyers, their results are incomparable to ours.
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Figure 3: Revenue curves for the uniform distribution on [0, 1] (left), and the distribution that
draws with probability 4/5 uniformly from [0, 4] and with the remaining probability uniformly
from [4, 10] (right).
by Bernstein polynomials preserves monotonicity and concavity, we are then able to establish
that the revenue gap is maximized when q∗ = k/n. A simplified version of the resulting upper
bound can be obtained from the well-known fact that the binomial distribution with n trials and
success probability k/n converges to the Poisson distribution with rate k. To obtain a matching
lower bound we consider a family of distributions with a piecewise linear revenue curve that is
monotone and, for some parameter r, bends at a revenue of r. We write the revenue gap for
distributions within this family as a maximin problem where in the upper level we choose r
and in the lower level an adversary chooses the probability q with which a single buyer accepts
the optimal static price. We then use Berge’s maximum theorem to establish the existence of a
choice of r for which the minimum in the lower level is attained at q = k/n, and observe that
the resulting lower bound is equal to the upper bound for all values of n and k.
In the case of general distributions a symmetric solution of the ex-ante relaxation may
correspond to a lottery over prices, and the methods described so far would only allow us to
bound the revenue gap between the ex-ante relaxation and a static lottery over two prices.
To bound the revenue gap for a single static price we instead consider a different lottery that
selects one of the prices for all buyers, and carefully choose the probabilities within the lottery
to express its expected revenue in terms of a convex combination of Bernstein polynomials of
a concave function. By using further properties of Bernstein polynomials we are then able to
determine the worst case for the upper bound, which occurs when the ex-ante relaxation sells
to n − k buyers with a vanishing probability and to k buyers with probability close to 1. A
simple two-point distribution shows that the resulting bound is again tight for all values of k
and n.
The ex-ante relaxation we consider, like previous relaxations of this type, in fact turns
out to relax not only the optimal dynamic prices but any incentive-compatible mechanism.2
Consequently our upper bounds apply even to the gap between the revenue from the best
incentive-compatible mechanism and the best static price. Our lower bounds show that the
upper bounds are tight already for the gap between dynamic and static prices.
1.2 Related Work
Dynamic pricing is one of the classic topics in operations research. Work in this area has
emphasized more complex models and has focused on characterizing and computing opti-
2The ex-ante relaxation was identified as a quantity of interest by Chawla et al. (2007) and used subsequently
for example by Yan (2011), Alaei (2014), and Chawla and Miller (2016).
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mal prices in these models (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994, 1997; Bitran and Mondschein, 1997;
Subramanian et al., 1999; Feng and Xiao, 2000; Aviv and Pazgal, 2005; Besbes and Zeevi, 2009;
Besbes and Lobel, 2015; Caldentey et al., 2017). This literature, however, has not quantified
how much revenue can be gained by using dynamic rather than static prices.
A question related to ours was first considered by Chawla et al. (2007), who used virtual
values to compare the maximum revenue from an incentive-compatible mechanism to that of
sequential posted prices. They gave dynamic prices approximating the optimal revenue from a
mechanism within a factor of 3. For identical regular distributions the prices are in fact identical
and an improved upper bound of 2.17 can be obtained. For identical irregular distributions the
authors gave a lower bound of 2. It is not difficult to see that both the upper bound of 2.17 and
the lower bound of 2 apply to the gap between dynamic and static pricing we consider here.
For the same problem and under the same assumptions, Chawla et al. (2010) obtained
tighter bounds by analyzing virtual values using results from optimal stopping theory, in par-
ticular the classic prophet inequality of Krengel and Sucheston (1977, 1978) and an improved
version due to the authors for a setting where buyers can be considered in a particular or-
der. When specialized to identical regular distributions, these results imply an upper bound of
e/(e−1) on the gap between dynamic and static prices. For general distributions the technique
requires an ironing step, and thus additional work to obtain an upper bound with respect to a
single static price rather than a static lottery over prices.
Non-identical distributions were first analyzed by Alaei et al. (2015), who formulated the
revenue gap between the optimal incentive-compatible mechanism and a static price as a math-
ematical program and through a series of relaxations obtained an upper bound of e ≈ 2.718 for
the case of regular distributions. In parallel work to our work a tight bound of roughly 2.62
was shown on the gap between dynamic and static prices for regular distributions (Jin et al.,
2019), while for general distributions this gap can be as large as n (Alaei et al., 2015).
Blumrosen and Holenstein (2008) gave a characterization of the optimal dynamic and static
prices for a single good and identical distributions, along with formulas for the asymptotic
revenue in terms of parameters of the distribution. For the regular power-law distribution they
showed that the maximum revenue obtained respectively by an incentive-compatible mechanism,
by dynamic prices, and by a static price is 0.89
√
n, 0.71
√
n, and 0.64
√
n, which implies an
asymptotic lower bound of approximately 0.71/0.64 ≈ 1.11 for the gap we are interested in.
The solution of an exercise set by Hartline (2017) provides an improved, yet not a tight, lower
bound for the single-good case.
All of these works on the gap between static and dynamic pricing belong to the rapidly
expanding literature on prophet inequalities (Hajiaghayi et al., 2007; Chawla et al., 2010;
Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012; Azar et al., 2014; Alaei, 2014; Du¨tting and Kleinberg, 2015;
Feldman et al., 2015; Rubinstein, 2016; Rubinstein and Singla, 2017; Du¨tting et al., 2017;
Correa et al., 2017; Abolhassani et al., 2017; Ehsani et al., 2018; Correa et al., 2019).
2 Preliminaries
We consider a situation with k homogeneous goods and a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of unit-demand
buyers, where k ≥ n. For i ∈ [n], we denote by vi the valuation of buyer i for receiving a good,
and assume that valuations are distributed independently according to the same non-negative,
and possibly discontinuous, probability distribution with cumulative distribution function F .
Denote by Fˆ (x) the left-sided limit of F at x, i.e., Fˆ (x) = limy↑x F (y). The revenue curve
of F then is the function R : [0, 1] → R≥0 such that R(q) = qFˆ−1(1 − q), where, with a
slight abuse of notation, Fˆ−1(1 − q) = max{p ≥ 0 : Fˆ (p) ≤ 1 − q}. By construction Fˆ is
left-continuous, so that the maximum is attained. Intuitively, R(q) is the maximum revenue
that can be obtained by selling a single good to a single buyer at a deterministic price so that
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the probability of sale is exactly q.3 We call distribution F regular if R is concave. Note that
for distributions with a non-vanishing density f(x) = Fˆ ′(x) regularity is equivalent to the fact
that
R′(q) =
(
qFˆ−1(1− q))′ = Fˆ−1(1− q)− q
f(Fˆ−1(1− q))
is non-decreasing for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting x = Fˆ−1(1− q) we obtain that
ϕ(x) = x− 1− Fˆ (x)
f(x)
is non-decreasing for all x. Our notion of regularity is thus equivalent to that of (Myerson,
1981), who calls ϕ the virtual value function of F , but is defined also for distributions without
a density.
For irregular distributions it will be useful to also consider an ironed revenue curve R˜ :
[0, 1]→ R≥0 given by
R˜(q) = sup
a∈[0,q],b∈[q,1]
(b− q)R(a) + (q − a)R(b)
b− a .
Intuitively, R˜(q) is the maximum revenue that can be obtained by selling a single good to a
single buyer using a lottery over prices so that the probability of sale is exactly q.
A sequential posted-price mechanism considers each of the buyers in turn, and as long as a
good is available offers the current buyer a price at which a good can be purchased. The buyer
purchases a good if its valuation exceeds the price it is being offered, otherwise it leaves without
a good. The price offered to buyer i may depend on the realized values vj of buyers j < i and
on distribution F , but not on the realized value vi of buyer i. The revenue of a mechanism then
is the expected sum of the prices at which the goods are sold, where the expectation is taken
over the joint distribution of buyers’ valuations.
We distinguish between dynamic prices, which may depend both on i and the number j of
goods still available when buyer i arrives, and static prices, which may depend on neither of
the two. Dynamic prices can be written as an n× k matrix p = (pi,j)i∈[n],j∈[k], where pi,j is the
price offered to buyer i when j goods are still available. Denoting by Qi,j(p) the probability
that exactly j goods are available when buyer i is considered, the revenue obtained by p is
RdF,n,k(p) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[k]
pi,j
(
1− Fˆ (pi,j)
)Qi,j(p).
A static price p ∈ R obtains a revenue of
RsF,n,k(p) =
n∑
j=1
min{j, k} p
(
n
j
)
Fˆ (p)n−j(1− Fˆ (p))j .
We denote by RdF,n,k and R
s
F,n,k the maximum revenue from static and dynamic prices, i.e.,
RdF,n,k = max
p∈Rn×k
≥0
Rdn(p) and R
s
F,n,k = max
p∈R≥0
Rsn(p).
Both static and dynamic prices are incentive compatible in the sense that they make it
optimal for each buyer to implicitly reveal its true valuation, by purchasing a good if and
3Note that when F is not continuous, a price that leads to a probability of sale of exactly q may not exist.
In this case R(q) is the revenue obtained by selling at the largest price that sells with probability at least q, but
only with probability q.
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only if the buyer’s valuation exceeds the price being offered. We may more generally consider
mechanisms which solicit a bid from each buyer and based on the bids determine an allocation
of goods to buyers and prices the buyers have to pay. An incentive-compatible mechanism then
is a mechanism in which it is optimal for each buyer to bid its true valuation assuming that the
other buyers do the same, in the sense that this maximizes the expected difference between the
buyer’s value from being assigned a good and its payment, where the expectation is taken over
the distribution of the values of the other buyers.4 We denote by Rmn,k the maximum revenue
from an incentive-compatible mechanism and note that for all F , n and k,
RsF,n,k ≤ RdF,n,k ≤ RmF,n,k.
For ease of exposition we will assume all three quantities to exist and be finite. All results
can be seen to hold in general by standard limit arguments.
3 An Ex-Ante Relaxation
As the revenue from dynamic prices is rather difficult to analyze directly, it will be useful to
consider instead an ex-ante relaxation of the associated maximization problem with revenue
RxF,n,k = max
{∑
i∈[n]
R˜(qi) : q ∈ [0, 1]n,
∑
i∈[n]
qi ≤ k
}
.
Intuitively this quantity relaxes the requirement that at most k goods can be sold to only hold in
expectation over the random draws from F . It is important to note that the definition of RxF,n,k
uses the ironed revenue curve R˜. In the case of regular distributions R and R˜ are identical,
so that a revenue of RxF,n,k could indeed be obtained by offering a good independently to each
buyer at a deterministic price and selling at most k goods in expectation. In the case of irregular
distributions a lottery over prices may be required to achieve the same.
In the following example we see that all four quantities RsF,n,k, R
d
F,n,k, R
m
F,n,k, and R
x
F,n,k are
distinct and the ex-ante relaxation provides an upper bound not only on the maximum revenue
from dynamic prices but also on that from any incentive-compatible mechanism.
Example (A single good and two buyers with uniform valuations). Consider a situation with
one good and two buyers with valuations drawn independently and uniformly from [0, 1], i.e.,
F (x) = x for max{0, x} for x ≤ 1 and F (x) = 1 for x > 1. It is not difficult to see that
RsF,2,1 = max
{
p
(
1− p2) : p ∈ R≥0} = 2
3
√
3
≈ 0.385,
RdF,2,1 = max
{
p1,1(1− p1,1) + p2,1(1− p2,1)p1,1 : p ∈ R2×1≥0
}
=
25
64
≈ 0.391.
The revenue-optimal incentive-compatible mechanism is a second-price auction with a reserve
price p∗ that corresponds to a probability maximizing the revenue curve, i.e., p∗ = 1/2, see also
Figure 3 for an illustration (Myerson, 1981). To compute the revenue of the optimal mechanism
let X1,X2 be drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and let Y1 = min{X1,X2} and
Y2 = max{X1,X2}. Then
RmF,2,1 =
1
2
Pr
[
Y1 ≤ 1
2
, Y2 ≥ 1
2
]
+ Pr
[
Y1 ≥ 1
2
]
E
[
Y1
∣∣∣∣ Y1 ≥ 12
]
=
1
2
· 1
2
+
1
4
· 2
3
=
5
12
≈ 0.417.
4Following the seminal work of Myerson (1981) on revenue-maximizing incentive-compatible mechanisms for
the case of a single good, such mechanisms are also referred to as optimal auctions. We use the standard notion
of incentive compatibility where truthful revelation of valuations is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
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For the ex-ante relaxation, we obtain
RxF,2,1 = max
{
q1(1− q1) + q2(1− q2) : q ∈ [0, 1]2, q1 + q2 ≤ 1
}
=
1
2
= 0.5.
We see that indeed in this example RsF,2,1 < R
d
F,2,1 < R
m
F,2,1 < R
x
F,2,1 as claimed. △
The following lemma shows that the ex-ante relaxation is always an upper bound on the
optimal auction revenue and, thus, also on the optimal revenue of dynamic pricing. Its uses
an argument analogous to those in the proofs of Theorem 1 of Alaei (2014) and Lemma 3.1 of
Chawla and Miller (2016).
Lemma 1. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and F be arbitrary. Then there exists q ∈ [0, 1]n such that∑n
i=1 qi ≤ k and RmF,n,k ≤
∑n
i=1 R˜(qi).
Proof. By definition of RmF,n,k there exists an incentive-compatible mechanism M that sells at
most k goods to n buyers and achieves revenue Rmn,k. Formally M = (x,p) for two functions
x : Rn≥0 → [0, 1]n and p : Rn≥0 → Rn≥0, such that for any vector v ∈ R≥0 of valuations, (x(v))i is
the probability that M assigns a good to buyer i and (p(v))i is the payment of buyer i. Denote
by qi = Ev∼Fn(x(v))i the probability that mechanism M sells a good to buyer i and observe
that
∑n
i=1 qi ≤ k.
For each buyer i we can construct from M a mechanism Mi that sells at most one good to
the single buyer i: given report vi from buyer i the mechanism draws (vj)j∈[n]\{i} from Fn−1,
assigns a good to buyer i with probability xi(v) and charges it a payment of pi(v).
Denote by Ri the expected revenue achieved byMi. Since the expected revenue from buyer i
is the same under M and Mi, R
m
F,n,k =
∑n
i=1Ri. Mechanisms M and Mi are indistinguishable
from the point of view of buyer i, so Mi is incentive compatible. This implies that Ri ≤ R˜(qi),
becauseMi sells to buyer i with probability qi and because R˜(qi) is the maximum revenue of any
incentive-compatible mechanism that sells to a single buyer with probability qi (e.g., Hartline,
2017). In summary
RmF,n,k =
n∑
i=1
Ri ≤
n∑
i=1
R˜(qi),
as claimed.
A useful property of the ex-ante relaxation in the case of identical distributions is the
existence of a symmetric optimum, as made precise by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and F be arbitrary. Then there exists q∗ ∈ [0, k/n] such
that RxF,n,k = nR˜(q
∗).
Proof. The objective of the ex-ante relaxation is a sum of concave functions and therefore
concave. Both the objective and the constraints are invariant under permutations of the set of
buyers. Consider an optimal solution q of the ex-ante relaxation, and let q¯ = 1n!
∑
π∈Sn(Pπq),
where Sn is the set of permutations of [n] and Pπ is the permutation matrix corresponding to
permutation π. Clearly q¯ is feasible. Moreover q¯ is invariant under permutations, so there must
exist some α ∈ R≥0 such that q¯ = α1. In fact, as q¯ is feasible, α ≤ k/n. Finally, by concavity
of the objective and by Jensen’s inequality,
∑
i∈[n]
R(q¯i) =
∑
i∈[n]
R
(
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
(Pπq)i
)
≥
∑
i∈[n]
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
R
(
(Pπq)i
)
=
∑
π∈Sn
1
n!
∑
i∈[n]
R
(
(Pπq)i
)
=
∑
π∈Sn
1
n!
∑
i∈[n]
R(qi) =
∑
i∈[n]
R(qi),
so q¯ is optimal.
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4 Regular Distributions
Our first objective will be to bound the revenue gap between dynamic and static prices for the
special case of regular distributions. We obtain the following upper bound, which will turn out
to be tight for all values of n and k.
Theorem 1. For any number n of buyers with values drawn independently from a regular
distribution F and any number k ≤ n of goods,
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ k
EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}]
,
where Bin(n, k/n) denotes a binomial distribution with n trials and success probability k/n.
Before proving this result we also give a simplified bound that can be obtained from well-
known properties of the approximation of a Poisson distribution by a series of binomial dis-
tributions. The development is standard and summarized in Appendix A.1 for completeness.
Corollary 1. For any number n of buyers with values drawn independently from a regular
distribution F and any number k ≤ n of goods,
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ 1
1− kk
ekk!
.
When k is large, then k! ≈
√
2πk
(
k
e
)k
by Stirling’s formula, so RxF,n,k/R
s
F,n,k ≈ 1/(1 − 1√2πk ).
4.1 Prerequisites for the Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1 we consider a symmetric optimum of the ex-ante relaxation, which exists
by Lemma 2. At a symmetric solution the value of the ex-ante relaxation becomes equal to nqp,
where q is the probability of selling to each individual buyer and p is a price that leads to this
probability of sale. If p is used instead as a static price, it produces a revenue of p times the
expected number of goods sold. The latter is given by a binomially distributed random variable
with n trials and success probability q, where in addition the value is capped at the number k
of available goods. To formalize this let gn,k : [0, 1]→ R≥0 and fn,k : [0, 1] → R≥0 such that for
all q ∈ [0, 1],
gn,k(q) = EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}],
fn,k(q) =
{
nq
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X,k}] if q > 0 and,
1 if q = 0.
We will use the following non-trivial monotonicity result for gn,k and fn,k.
Lemma 3. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n. Then gn,k and fn,k are continuous and non-decreasing.
To prove the lemma it is useful to view the expectation EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}] as an approx-
imation of the function h(q) = min{q, k} by Bernstein polynomials. By the Stone-Weierstrass
theorem every continuous function on a closed interval can be uniformly approximated with
arbitrary precision by polynomials. The approximation of a function f by its Bernstein poly-
nomial Bn(f ; ·) is mathematically well-behaved and in particular preserves properties such as
monotonicity or concavity (e.g., Philipps, 2003, § 7). Given a function f : [0, 1] → R and
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n ∈ N>0, the Bernstein polynomial of f of degree n is the function Bn(f ; ·) : [0, 1] → R such
that for all q ∈ [0, 1],
Bn(f ; q) =
n∑
j=0
f
(
j
n
)(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j.
Since h(q) = min{q, k/n} is non-decreasing and concave, so is
Bn(h; q) =
n∑
j=0
min{j, q}
(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j = EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}] = gn,k(q),
With this knowledge, monotonicity of fn,k can be shown by standard calculus. A formal proof
of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix A.2.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By Lemma 2 the ex-ante relaxation has a symmetric optimum, i.e., there exists q∗ ∈
[0, k/n] such that RxF,n,k = nR˜(q
∗). By regularity of the distribution the revenue curve R is
concave, so R˜(q∗) = R(q∗). Letting p∗ = Fˆ−1(1 − q∗), we thus obtain RxF,n,k = nR(q∗) =
nq∗Fˆ−1(1− q∗) = nq∗p∗. On the other hand
RsF,n,k(p
∗) = p∗ EX∼Bin(n,1−Fˆ (p∗))
[
min{X, k}]
≥ p∗ minz∈[q∗, 1]EX∼Bin(n,z)
[
min{X, k}]
= p∗ EX∼Bin(n,q∗)
[
min{X, k}],
where the inequality holds because p∗ = max{p ≥ 0 : Fˆ (p) ≤ 1−q∗} and thus 1−Fˆ (p∗) ∈ [q∗, 1],
and the second equality by Lemma 3. Thus
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ R
x
F,n,k
RsF,n,k(p
∗)
≤ nq
∗p∗
p∗EX∼Bin(n,q∗)[min{X, k}]
=
nq∗
EX∼Bin(n,q∗)[min{X, k}]
.
By Lemma 3 the right-hand side of this expression is non-decreasing in q∗, and since q∗ ≤ k/n
we conclude that
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ k
EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}]
,
as claimed.
4.3 A Matching Lower Bound
To obtain a lower bound matching the upper bound of Theorem 1 we consider a family of
distributions parameterized by r ∈ [0, 1] and ǫ > 0 that are regular and whose revenue curves
are piece-wise linear and bend at ǫ. The limiting revenue curve R as ǫ → 0 is linear on (0, 1]
and satisfies R(0) = 0, R(1) = 1 and limq↓0R(q) = r. Examples of these distributions and their
revenue curves are shown in Figure 4.
Using dynamic prices it is possible to sell a good with probability close to 0 to each of
the first n − k buyers and with probability close to 1 to each of the remaining k buyers, thus
obtaining an overall revenue close to (n− k)r+ k. A static price that sells with probability q to
an individual buyer obtains revenue at most r+ q(1− r) for each good sold, and the number of
such goods is EX∼Bin(n,q)min{X, k}. Our goal now is to choose r such that for the corresponding
optimal choice of q the gap in revenue between dynamic and static prices is as large as possible.
This maximin problem turns out to be rather difficult to solve directly, but we will appeal to
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution functions (left) and revenue curves (right) for probability
distributions used in the proof of Theorem 2. The blue and red curves correspond to the cases
where r = 1/2 and where ǫ = ǫ1 = 1/3 and ǫ = ǫ2 = 1/6, respectively. The green curve
corresponds to the limit as ǫ→ 0.
Berge’s maximum principle (Berge, 1963) to show the existence of a value of r that leads to
an optimal choice of q = k/n. By the upper bound of Theorem 1 and by the existence of a
symmetric optimum of the ex-ante relaxation the latter is in fact necessary for tightness.
We obtain the following result, which is proved formally in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 2. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and δ > 0. Then there exists a regular distribution F
such that
RdF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≥ k
EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}]
− δ.
5 General Distributions
We proceed by bounding the revenue gap between dynamic and static prices also for general
distributions. The following upper bound, which will again turn out to be tight for all values of
n and k, reveals a qualitative difference between the gap for distributions that are regular and
the gap for those that are not.
Theorem 3. For any number n of buyers with values drawn independently from a distribution F
and any number k ≤ n of goods,
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ 2− k
n
.
To readers familiar with the ironing technique of Myerson (1981), which in the context of
incentive-compatible mechanisms enables a uniform treatment of regular and irregular distri-
butions, it may seem surprising at first that the two types of distributions would give rise to
different bounds. Before proving Theorem 3 we therefore demonstrate that a straightforward
application of the ironing technique can bound the revenue from dynamic prices only relative
to that from a static lottery over at most two prices and not relative to that from a single static
price. Such a lottery can be defined formally in terms of p1, p2 ∈ R and β ∈ [0, 1] and offers
a good to each buyer at price p1 with probability β and at price p2 with probability 1 − β.
Denoting by RlF,n,k the maximum revenue that can be achieved by a static lottery over two
prices for n buyers and k goods, it can be shown with the same arguments as in Section 4 that
for any n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and even for irregular distributions,
RxF,n,k
RlF,n,k
≤ k
EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}]
.
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The crucial observation is that in the irregular case, a symmetric solution of the ex-ante relax-
ation that sells to each buyer with probability q may not correspond to a single price but rather
to a lottery over two prices with an overall probability of sale equal to q. Since static prices
and static lotteries over prices are equally powerful for regular distributions, and in particular
for the family of distributions used in the proof of Theorem 2, the bound is tight for all values
of n and k. A straightforward derandomization of a static lottery over two prices using the
method of conditional expectations does not lead to a bound like that of Theorem 3 because it
may offer two distinct prices to different subsets of the buyers. Theorem 3, by contrast, holds
relative to a single static price.
5.1 Prerequisites for the Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3 we again start with a symmetric optimum of the ex-ante relaxation, which
is guaranteed to exist by Lemma 2. In Section 4 we were ultimately able to express the revenue
gap between a symmetric optimum that sells to each buyer with probability q in terms of the
function
fn,k(q) =
{
nq
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X,k}] if q > 0 and
1 if q = 0.
We then established monotonicity of fn,k and concluded that the revenue gap is maximized
when q = k/n.
The reason why this argument does not carry over to irregular distributions is that for such
distributions a symmetric solution of the ex-ante relaxation may not correspond to a single
static price p but rather to a static lottery over prices p1 and p2. To nevertheless prove an
upper bound on the revenue gap in this case we will instead consider a carefully chosen lottery
over the static prices p1 and p2, i.e., a lottery that selects one of these prices randomly and then
offers it to all of the bidders. Our first objective will be to show that the lottery can be chosen
in such a way that its revenue gap relative to the ex-ante relaxation is bounded by a convex
combination of the form
λ1fn,k(q1) + λ2fn,k(q2)
under the constraint that λ1q1 + λ2q2 = k/n. We will then argue that this gap is maximized
when q1 = 0 and q2 = 1. Together with monotonicity of fn,k, the latter would follow from
its convexity, but a proof of convexity unfortunately remains elusive. We will show instead
that fn,k lies below its secant line, i.e., below the function sn,k : [0, 1] → R≥0 such that for all
q ∈ [0, 1],
sn,k(q) = (1− q)fn,k(0) + qfn,k(1).
This is established by the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let n, k ∈ N such that k ≤ n. Then, for all q ∈ [0, 1], fn,k(q) ≤ sn,k(q).
To prove the lemma we again exploit the close connection between fn,k and approximations
by Bernstein polynomials. For α > 0 let hα(q) = min{q, α}, and observe that for Lemma 4 it
suffices to show that for all α > 0 and all n ≥ ⌈1/α⌉,
q
Bn(hα; q)
≤ (1− q) + q
α
.
Indeed, the lemma follows from this claim by setting α = k/n. For n = ⌈1/α⌉ the Bernstein
polynomial Bn(hα; q) has a very simple structure since min{j/n, α} = α for all j ≥ 1, and
the claim can be shown using a Bernoulli-type inequality. To show that the claim holds for
n ≥ ⌈1/α⌉ we use that the approximation of a concave function h by Bernstein polynomials is
monotone in n in the sense that for all q ∈ [0, 1], Bn(h; q) ≤ Bn+1(h; q) ≤ h(q). A detailed
proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix B.1.
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. By Lemma 2 and by definition of R˜ there respectively exist q∗ ∈ [0, k/n] such that
RxF,n,k = nR˜(q
∗) and q1, q2, β ∈ [0, 1] such that R˜(q∗) = βR(q1) + (1− β)R(q2). Thus
RxF,n,k = n
(
βR(q1) + (1− β)R(q2)
)
.
Since q∗ ≤ k/n, it further holds that βq1 + (1− β)q2 ≤ k/n.
Let
α1 =
βR(q1)
RsF,n,k(Fˆ
−1(1− q1))
and α2 =
(1− β)R(q2)
RsF,n,k(Fˆ
−1(1− q2))
,
and consider a lottery that selects a static price of p1 = Fˆ
−1(1−q1) with probability proportional
to α1 and a static price of p2 = Fˆ
−1(1 − q2) with probability proportional to α2. This lottery
achieves an expected revenue of
α1
α1 + α2
RsF,n,k(p1) +
α2
α1 + α2
RsF,n,k(p2) =
βR(q1)
α1 + α2
+
(1− β)R(q2)
α1 + α2
=
RxF,n,k
n(α1 + α2)
.
Since a lottery over the static prices p1 and p2 achieves a revenue of R
x
F,n,k/n(α1+α2), so does one
of the static prices, i.e., either RxF,n,k/R
s
F,n,k(p1) ≤ n(α1+α2) or RxF,n,k/RsF,n,k(p2) ≤ n(α1+α2).
In particular we obtain
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ n(α1 + α2) ≤
sup
{
βnR(q1)
RsF,n,k(Fˆ
−1(1− q1))
+
(1− β)nR(q2)
RsF,n,k(Fˆ
−1(1− q2))
: β, q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1], βq1 + (1− β)q2 ≤ k
n
}
.
Now, for q ∈ {q1, q2},
nR(q)
RsF,n,k(Fˆ
−1(1− q)) =
nqFˆ−1(1− q)
Fˆ−1(1− q)EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
=
nq
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
= fn,k(q),
and thus
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ sup
{
βfn,k(q1) + (1− β)fn,k(q2) : β, q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1], βq1 + (1− β)q2 ≤ k
n
}
.
We may assume without loss of generality that q1 ≤ q2. Since, by Lemma 3, fn,k(q) is
non-decreasing in q, we may further increase q2 until the constraint βq1 + (1 − β)q2 ≤ k/n
becomes tight and therefore assume without of loss of generality that q1 ≤ k/n, q2 > k/n, and
βq1 + (1− β)q2 = k/n. Thus
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ sup
{
q2 − kn
q2 − q1 fn,k(q1) +
k
n − q1
q2 − q1 fn,k(q2) : q1 ∈
[
0,
k
n
]
, q2 ∈
(k
n
, 1
]}
.
Geometrically the expression in the supremum corresponds to the value at k/n of the secant
line of the function fn,k through the points (q1, fn,k(q1)) and (q2, fn,k(q2)). By Lemma 3 fn,k
is non-decreasing and by Lemma 4 it lies below the secant line through the points (0, fn,k(0))
and (1, fn,k(1)), so the supremum is attained when q1 = 0 and q2 = 1. Since fn,k(0) = 1 and
fn,k(1) = n/k,
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ 1− k
n
+ 1 = 2− k
n
as claimed.
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5.3 A Matching Lower Bound
In search of a lower bound matching the upper bound of Theorem 3 we may restrict our attention
to distributions where the optimal static price extracts revenue 1 from each of k buyers. The
proof of Theorem 3 suggests, on the other hand, that the optimal dynamic prices should sell
with vanishing probability to n − k of the buyers while still extracting revenue k/n from each
of them in expectation, and with probability and expected revenue approaching 1 for each of
the remaining k buyers. We show in Appendix B.2 that this can be achieved for a discrete
distribution with support of size two, and obtain the following result.
Theorem 4. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and δ > 0. Then there exists a distribution F such that
RdF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≥ 2− k
n
− δ.
A Auxiliary Lemmas for Section 4
A.1 Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1. For any number n of buyers with values drawn independently from a regular
distribution F and any number k ≤ n of goods,
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ 1
1− kk
ekk!
.
To prove Corollary 1, we need the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5. Let n, k ∈ N such that k ≤ n. Then
EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}] ≥ EX∼Poi(k)[min{X, k}].
Proof. For D ∈ {Bin(n, k/n),Poi(k)},
EX∼D[min{X, k}] =
k∑
j=1
PrX∼D[X ≥ j] =
k−1∑
j=0
(
1−PrX∼D[X ≤ j]
)
.
By a result of Anderson and Samuels (1967) PrBin(n,k/n)(X ≤ j) ≤ PrPoi(k)(X ≤ j) precisely
when 0 ≤ j ≤ k − k/(n+ 1). Since k ≤ n, this condition is satisfied for all terms in the sum on
the right-hand side, and thus
EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}] =
k−1∑
j=0
(
1−PrBin(n,k/n)[X ≤ j]
)
≥
k−1∑
j=0
(
1−PrPoi(k)[X ≤ j]
)
= EX∼Poi(k)[min{X, k}],
as claimed.
Proof of Corollary 1. We claim that
RxF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≤ k
EX∼Poi(k)[min{X, k}]
=
1
1− kk
ekk!
.
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Indeed the inequality holds by Lemma 5, and the equality because
EX∼Poi(k)[min{X, k}] =
∞∑
j=0
kj
ekj!
min{j, k}
= k −
k−1∑
j=0
kj
ekj!
(
k − j)
= k −
k−1∑
j=0
kj+1
ekj!
+
k−1∑
j=1
kj
ek(j − 1)!
= k −
k−1∑
j=0
kj+1
ekj!
+
k−2∑
j=0
kj+1
ekj!
= k − k
k
ek(k − 1)! .
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Recall that
gn,k(q) = EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}],
fn,k(q) =
{
nq
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X,k}] if q > 0 and,
1 if q = 0.
Lemma 3. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n. Then gn,k and fn,k are continuous and non-decreasing.
Proof. Continuity of gn,k on [0, 1] and of fn,k on (0, 1] is obvious. For continuity of fn,k at q = 0
note that
lim
q→0
fn,k(q) = lim
q→0
nq∑n
j=1min{j, k}
(n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j
= lim
q→0
1∑n
j=1min
{ j
n ,
k
n
}(n
j
)
qj−1(1− q)n−j =
1
min{ 1n , kn}
(
n
1
) = 1,
where the third inequality holds because limq→0 qj−1 = 1 if j = 1 and limq→0 qj−1 = 0 if j > 1.
To see that gn,k is non-decreasing, recall the definition of the Bernstein polynomial of degree
n ∈ N>0 of a function f : [0, 1] → R as the function Bn(f ; ·) : [0, 1] → R such that for all
q ∈ [0, 1],
Bn(f ; q) =
n∑
j=0
f
(
j
n
)(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j.
Let h : [0, 1]→ R such that h(x) = min{x, k/n}, and observe that gn,k(q) = nBn(h; q). Since h
is non-decreasing and concave and approximation by Bernstein polynomials preserves these
properties (Philipps, 2003, § 7), gn,k = nBn(h; q) is non-decreasing and concave.
By continuity of fn,k it suffices to show that fn,k is non-decreasing on (0, 1). For q > 0,
fn,k(q) =
nq
gn,k(q)
. Since
gn,k(q) = n
n∑
j=0
min
{
j
n
,
k
n
}(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j ,
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both gn,k and fn,k are differentiable on (0, 1). In particular, for q ∈ (0, 1),
f ′n,k(q) = n
gn,k(q)− qg′n,k(q)
gn,k(q)2
.
Fix q ∈ (0, 1). Since gn,k(0) = 0 and by the mean value theorem, there exists some ξ ∈ (0, q) such
that g′(ξ) = gn,k(q)/q. Together with concavity of gn,k this implies that gn,k(q) = qg′n,k(ξ) ≥
qg′n,k(q), so f
′
n,k is non-negative and fn,k non-decreasing on (0, 1).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and δ > 0. Then there exists a regular distribution F
such that
RdF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≥ k
EX∼Bin(n,k/n)[min{X, k}]
− δ.
Proof. Let r ∈ R and ǫ > 0, and consider a distribution with support [1, 1ǫ ] and cumulative
distribution function F such that
F (p) =

1−
1− 1−r
1−ǫ
p− 1−r
1−ǫ
if p ∈ [1, 1ǫ ) and
1 if p = 1ǫ .
This distribution is continuous on [1, 1ǫ ) and has point mass at
1
ǫ . Its revenue curveR is piecewise
linear with slope r/ǫ on (0, ǫ) and slope 1−r1−ǫ on (ǫ, 1), and is given by
R(q) =
{
r
ǫ · q if q ∈ [0, ǫ] and
1−r
1−ǫ · q + (1− 1−r1−ǫ ) if q ∈ (ǫ, 1).
Consider a matrix p ∈ Rn×k of dynamic prices such that
pi,j = Fˆ
−1(1− ǫ) = R(ǫ)
ǫ
=
r
ǫ
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − k}, j ∈ [k],
pi,j = Fˆ
−1(0) = R(1) = 1 for all i ∈ {n− k + 1, . . . , n}, j ∈ [k].
The revenue obtained by these prices is at least
n−k∑
i=1
(
(1− ǫ)i−1R(ǫ))+ k(1 − ǫ)n−kR(1) ≥ ((n− k)r + k)(1− ǫ)n−k,
because each of the first n− k buyers contributes R(ǫ) to the revenue at least in the case where
no goods have been sold to any of the earlier buyers, and each of the last k buyers contributes
R(1) at least in the case where no goods were sold to the first n− k buyers.
In determining the maximum revenue from a static price we can restrict our attention to
prices p ∈ [1, 1ǫ ], as prices below 1 are dominated in terms of revenue by a price of 1 and prices
above 1ǫ sell with probability zero. Prices p ∈ [1, 1ǫ ] allow us to sell to a single buyer with
probability q for any q ∈ [ǫ, 1], and obtain an overall revenue of
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
R(q)
q
≤ EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
r + q(1− r)
q
,
where the inequality holds because for any ǫ > 0, R(q) ≤ r + q(1− r).
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For n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and ǫ > 0, define Tn,k,ǫ : [ǫ, 1]× [0, 1]→ R such that for all q ∈ [ǫ, 1]
and r ∈ [0, 1],
Tn,k,ǫ(q, r) =
(
(n− k)r + k)q
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
(
r + q(1− r)) (1− ǫ)n−k.
Note that Tn,k,ǫ(q, r) is well-defined, since the denominator is greater than zero for all q ≥ ǫ > 0
and k ≥ 1, and continuous on its domain. Note further that for all ǫ > 0
RdF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≥ maxr∈[0,1]minq∈[ǫ,1] Tn,k,ǫ(q, r),
if indeed the maximin problem has a solution.
The maximin problem turns out to be rather difficult to solve directly, and we will instead
give a non-constructive proof of the claimed lower bound. To this end, we first show the
existence of r∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that minq∈[0,1] Tn,k,ǫ(q, r∗) is attained at q = k/n, i.e., that k/n ∈
argminq∈[0,1] Tn,k,ǫ(q, r∗). For n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and ǫ > 0, let Tn,k,ǫ : [0, 1] → 2[ǫ,1] such that
for all r ∈ [0, 1],
Tn,k,ǫ(r) = argminq∈[ǫ,1] Tn,k(q, r).
By Berge’s maximum theorem (Berge, 1963) this correspondence is nonempty- and compact-
valued and upper hemicontinuous, which implies in particular that the graph
G(Tn,k,ǫ) = {(q, r) : r ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ Tn,k,ǫ}
is a closed and connected set in R2. Note further that
Tn,k,ǫ(0) = argminq∈[ǫ,1] Tn,k,ǫ(q, 0)
= argminq∈[ǫ,1]
{
k
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
(1− ǫ)n−k
}
= {1},
where the last equality holds because k
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X,k}] is strictly decreasing in q, and that
Tn,k,ǫ(1) = argminq∈[ǫ,1] Tn,k,ǫ(q, 1)
= argminq∈[ǫ,1]
{
nq
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
(1− ǫ)n−k
}
= {0},
where the last equality holds because for all q > 0,
nq
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
=
EX∼Bin(n,q)[X]
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
> 1.
Since G(Tn,k,ǫ) is a closed and connected set in R2 and contains the points (0, 1) and (1, 0), it
must have a nonempty intersection with the line {(k/n, r) : r ∈ [0, 1]}. This intersection yields
r∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that k/n ∈ Tn,k,ǫ(r∗).
Now
maxr∈[0,1]minq∈[ǫ,1] Tn,k,ǫ(q, r) ≥ minq∈[ǫ,1]
{
Tn,k,ǫ(q, r
∗)
}
= minq∈[0,1]
{ (
(n− k)r∗ + k)q
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
(
r∗ + q(1− r∗))(1− ǫ)n−k
}
=
(
(n− k)r∗ + k) kn
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
(
r∗ + kn(1− r∗)
)(1− ǫ)n−k
=
(
nr∗ + (1− r∗)k)k
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
(
nr∗ + (1− r∗)k)(1− ǫ)n−k
=
k
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X, k}]
(1− ǫ)n−k.
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By continuity of Tn,k,ǫ in ǫ and by continuity of the maximum and minimum,
maxr∈[0,1]minq∈[ǫ,1] limǫ→0 Tn,k,ǫ(q, r) = limǫ→0maxr∈[0,1]minq∈[ǫ,1] Tn,k,ǫ(q, r),
so choosing ǫ small enough establishes the claim.
B Auxiliary Lemmas for Section 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Recall that
fn,k(q) =
{
nq
EX∼Bin(n,q)[min{X,k}] if q > 0,
1 if q = 0, and
sn,k(q) = (1− q)fn,k(0) + qfn,k(1).
Lemma 4. Let n, k ∈ N such that k ≤ n. Then, for all q ∈ [0, 1], fn,k(q) ≤ sn,k(q).
The proof uses the following variant of Bernoulli’s inequality.
Lemma 6. Let k ∈ N ∪ {0} and x ∈ (0, 1). Then (1− x)k ≤ (1 + kx)−1.
Proof. For k = 0, the statement is trivial. For k ≥ 1, we show the statement by induction. For
k = 1 the claim is that 1− x ≤ (1 + x)−1, which holds when x > 0. Then, for k ≥ 1,
(1− x)k+1 = (1− x)k(1− x)
≤ (1 + kx)−1(1 + x)−1
= (1 + kx+ x+ kx2)−1
≤ (1 + (k + 1)x)−1,
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis, the second inequality that kx2 ≥ 0,
and both inequalities that x ≥ 0 and 1− x ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. The lemma holds trivially when k = n since fn,n(q) = 1 for all q ∈ [0, 1].
We proceed to show it for the case where k < n.
For α ∈ (0, 1) let hα : [0, 1] → R and sα : [0, 1] → R such that hα(q) = min{q, α} and
sα(q) = (1 − q) + qα for all q ∈ [0, 1]. We will show the lemma by showing the stronger claim
that for all α ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N with n ≥ ⌈1/α⌉, and q ∈ (0, 1),
q
Bn(hα; q)
≤ sα(q).
This claim indeed implies the lemma because for all n, k ∈ N with k < n, q ∈ (0, 1), and
α = k/n,
fn,k(q) =
q
Bn(hk/n; q)
=
q
Bn(hα; q)
≤ sα(q) = sn,k(q),
and thus fn,k(q) ≤ sn,k(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1] by continuity of sn,k and fn,k.
We first show the claim for n = ⌈1/α⌉, in which case
1
n
=
1
⌈1/α⌉ ≤
1
1/α
= α and
2
n
=
2
⌈1/α⌉ ≥
2
1/α + 1
=
2α
1 + α
≥ α.
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Then
Bn(hα; q) =
n∑
j=0
hα
(
j
n
)(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j
=
n∑
j=0
min
{
j
n
, α
}(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j
= 0 + q(1− q)n−1 +
n∑
j=2
α
(
n
j
)
qj(1− q)n−j
= q(1− q)n−1 + α
[
1− (1− q)n − nq(1− q)n−1
]
= α
[ q
α
(1− q)n−1 + 1− (1− q)(1− q)n−1 − nq(1− q)n−1
]
= α
[
1 + (1− q)n−1
( q
α
− 1 + q − nq
)]
= α
[
1− (1− q)n−1
(
1 + (n− 1)q − q
α
)]
,
and the claim that q
Bn(hα;q)
≤ sα(q) is equivalent to
q
α
[
1− (1− q)n−1(1 + (n− 1)q − qα)] ≤ 1− q +
q
α
,
q(
(1− q)α+ q)[1− (1− q)n−1(1 + (n− 1)q − qα)] ≤ 1,(
(1− q)α+ q)[1− (1− q)n−1(1 + (n− 1)q − q
α
)]
− q ≥ 0,
(1− q)α− ((1− q)α+ q)[(1− q)n−1(1 + (n− 1)q − q
α
)]
≥ 0,
α
[
1− q −
(
1− q + q
a
)
(1− q)n−1
(
1 + (n− 1)q − q
α
)]
≥ 0, and
α(1− q)
[
1− (1− q)n−2
(
1− q + q
a
)(
1 + (n− 1)q − q
α
)]
≥ 0.
Since α(1 − q) ≥ 0 and n = ⌈1/α⌉, it suffices to show that
(1− q)⌈1/α⌉−2
(
1− q + q
α
)(
1− q − q
α
+ q
⌈
1
α
⌉)
≤ 1.
Note that (1 − q + qα) ≥ 0 and (1 − q − qα + q⌈ 1α⌉) ≥ 0. Note further that α < 1 and thus
⌈1/α⌉ ≥ 2, so that by Lemma 6, (1− q)⌈1/α⌉−2 ≤ (1 + (⌈1/α⌉ − 2)q)−1. It thus suffices to show
that
1
1 + q⌈ 1α⌉ − 2q
(
1− q + q
α
)(
1− q − q
α
+ q
⌈
1
α
⌉)
≤ 1.
Since 1 + q⌈1/α⌉ − 2q ≥ 0 this is equivalent to
1 + q
⌈
1
α
⌉
− 2q ≥
(
1− q + q
α
)(
1− q − q
α
+ q
⌈
1
α
⌉)
=
[
1 + q
(
1
α
− 1
)][
1 + q
(⌈
1
α
⌉
− 1
α
− 1
)]
= 1 + q
(
1
α
− 1 +
⌈
1
α
⌉
− 1
α
− 1
)
+ q2
(
1
α
− 1
)(⌈
1
α
⌉
− 1
α
− 1
)
= 1 + q
(⌈
1
α
⌉
− 2
)
+ q2
(
1
α
− 1
)(⌈
1
α
⌉
− 1
α
− 1
)
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and to
q2
(
1
α
− 1
)(⌈
1
α
⌉
− 1
α
− 1
)
≤ 0,
which is satisfied because q2 ≥ 0, 1α − 1 ≥ 0, and ⌈1/α⌉ − 1/α − 1 ≤ 0.
We have shown that for all α ∈ (0, 1) and n = ⌈1/α⌉, and q ∈ (0, 1),
q
Bn(hα; q)
≤ sα(q).
To see that this holds in fact for all n ≥ ⌈1/α⌉, it suffices to show that for all q ∈ [0, 1],
q
Bn(hα; q)
≤ q
B⌈1/α⌉(hα; q)
.
The latter follows from concavity of hα for all α ∈ (0, 1] and from monotonicity of the approx-
imation of a concave function h : [0, 1] → R by Bernstein polynomials in the sense that for all
q ∈ [0, 1], Bn(h; q) ≤ Bn+1(h; q) ≤ h(q) (Philipps, 2003, § 7).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n and δ > 0. Then there exists a distribution F such that
RdF,n,k
RsF,n,k
≥ 2− k
n
− δ.
Proof. Let ǫ > 0 and consider the discrete distribution with support {1, knǫ }, Pr[vi = 1] = 1− ǫn2 ,
and Pr[vi =
kn
ǫ ] =
ǫ
n2
. Let X ∼ Bin(n, ǫ/n2) and Y ∼ Bin(n − k, ǫ/n2). Clearly the optimal
static price p must be either 1 or knǫ , and R
s
F,n,k(1) = k and
RsF,n,k
(
kn
ǫ
)
= E[min{X, k}]kn
ǫ
≤ E[X]kn
ǫ
=
ǫ
n
· kn
ǫ
= k.
On the other hand, for dynamic prices p where pi =
kn
ǫ if i ≤ n− k and pi = 1 otherwise,
lim
ǫ→0
RdF,n,k(p) = lim
ǫ→0
E[min{Y, k}]
(
kn
ǫ
− 1
)
+ k
= lim
ǫ→0
((
Pr[Y < k] · E[Y ] +Pr[Y ≥ k] · k)(kn
ǫ
− 1
))
+ k
≥ lim
ǫ→0
(
1−
( ǫ
n2
)k)(
E[Y ]
(
kn
ǫ
− 1
)
+ k
)
= lim
ǫ→0
(
1−
( ǫ
n2
)k)(
(n− k) ǫ
n2
(
kn
ǫ
− 1
)
+ k
)
= (n− k)k
n
+ k = 2k − k
2
n
.
Choosing ǫ small enough shows the claim.
References
M. Abolhassani, S. Ehsani, H. Esfandiari, M. T. Hajiaghayi, R. D. Kleinberg, and B. Lucier.
Beating 1 − 1/e for ordered prophets. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, pages 61–71, 2017.
S. Alaei. Bayesian combinatorial auctions: Expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 43(2):930–972, 2014.
21
S. Alaei, J. D. Hartline, R. Niazadeh, E. Pountourakis, and Y. Yuan. Optimal auctions
vs. anonymous pricing. In Proceedings of the 56th Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, pages 1446–1463, 2015.
T. W. Anderson and S. M. Samuels. Some inequalities among binomial and Poisson probabilities.
In Proceedings of the 5th Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability,
pages 1–12, 1967.
Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal. A partially observed Markov decision process for dynamic pricing.
Management Science, 51(9):1400–1416, 2005.
P. D. Azar, R. Kleinberg, and S. M. Weinberg. Prophet inequalities with limited information.
In Proceedings of the 25th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages
1358–1377, 2014.
B. Barry and R. Oliver. Affect in dyadic negotiation: A model and propositions. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67:127–143, 1996.
C. Berge. Topological Spaces. Macmillan, New York, NY, USA, 1963.
O. Besbes and I. Lobel. Intertemporal price discrimination: Structure and computation of
optimal policies. Management Science, 61:92–110, 2015.
O. Besbes and A. Zeevi. Dynamic pricing without knowing the demand function: Risk bounds
and near-optimal algorithms. Operations Research, 57(6):1407–1420, 2009.
G. R. Bitran and S. V. Mondschein. Periodic pricing of seasonal products in retailing. Man-
agement Science, 43(1):64–79, 1997.
L. Blumrosen and T. Holenstein. Posted prices vs. negotiations: An asymptotic analysis. In
Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, page 49, 2008.
R. A. Briesch, L. Krishnamurthi, T. Mazumdar, and S. P. Raj. A comparative analysis of
reference price models. Journal of Consumer Research, 24:202–214, 1997.
R. Caldentey, Y. Liu, and I. Lobel. Intertemporal pricing under minimax regret. Operations
Research, 65:104–129, 2017.
T. Chakraborty, E. Evan-Dar, S. Guha, Y. Mansour, and S. Muthukrishnan. Approximation
schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions. In Proceedings of the 6th Inter-
national Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pages 158–169, 2010.
S. Chawla and J. B. Miller. Mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation.
In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 579–596,
2016.
S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, and R. D. Kleinberg. Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations. In
Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 243–251, 2007.
S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. L. Malec, and B. Sivan. Multi-parameter mechanism design and
sequential posted pricing. In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, pages 311–320, 2010.
J. Correa, P. Foncea, R. Hoeksma, T. Oosterwijk, and T. Vredeveld. Posted price mechanisms
for a random stream of customers. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Economics
and Computation, pages 169–186, 2017.
22
J. Correa, R. Saona, and B. Ziliotto. Prophet secretary through blind strategies. In Proceedings
of the 30th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1946–1961, 2019.
P. Du¨tting and R. Kleinberg. Polymatroid prophet inequalities. In Proceedings of the 23rd
European Symposium on Algorithms, pages 437–449, 2015.
P. Du¨tting, M. Feldman, T. Kesselheim, and B. Lucier. Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochas-
tic optimization by pricing non-stochastic inputs. In Proceedings of the 58th Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, pages 540–551, 2017.
S. Ehsani, M. T. Hajiaghayi, T. Kesselheim, and S. Singla. Prophet secretary for combinatorial
auctions and matroids. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
Algorithms, pages 700–714, 2018.
C. Ewerhart. Regular type distributions in mechanism design and ρ-concavity. Economic
Theory, 53:591–603, 2013.
M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. Combinatorial auctions via posted prices. In Proceedings
of the 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 123–135, 2015.
Y. Feng and B. Xiao. Optimal policies of yield management with multiple predetermined prices.
Operations Research, 48(2):332–343, 2000.
G. Fox. A warning to all the merchants in London and such as buy and sell. Thomas Simmons,
London, UK, 1658.
G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin. Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand
over finite horizons. Management Science, 40(8):999–1020, 1994.
G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin. A multiproduct dynamic pricing problem and its applications to
network yield management. Operations Research, 45(1):24–41, 1997.
J. P. Gilbert and F. Mosteller. Recognizing the maximum of a sequence. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 61:35–73, 1966.
M. T. Hajiaghayi, R. D. Kleinberg, and T. Sandholm. Automated online mechanism design and
prophet inequalities. In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 58–65, 2007.
J. Hartline. Mechanism Design and Approximation. 2017. Unpublished, draft available from
http://jasonhartline.com/MDnA/.
Y. Jin, P. Lu, Z. G. Tang, and T. Xiao. Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms. In
Proceedings of the 30th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 209–
228, 2019.
D. Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler. Fairness and the assumptions of economics.
The Journal of Business, 59:285–300, 1986a.
D. Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking:
Entitlements in the market. American Economic Review, 76(4):728–741, 1986b.
A. Kambil and V. Agrawal. The new realities of dynamic pricing. Outlook, 2:15–21, 2001.
S. A. Kent. The Quaker ethic and the fixed price policy: Max Weber and beyond. Sociological
Inquiry, 53:16–28, 1983.
23
R. Kleinberg and S. M. Weinberg. Matroid prophet inequalities. In Proceedings of the 44th
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 123–136, 2012.
U. Krengel and L. Sucheston. Semiamarts and finite values. Bulletin of the American Mathe-
matical Society, 83:745–747, 1977.
U. Krengel and L. Sucheston. On semiamarts, amarts, and processes with finite value. Advances
in Probability Related Topics, pages 197–266, 1978.
A. G. Mauri. Yield management and perceptions of fairness in the hotel business. International
Review of Economics, 54:284–293, 2007.
R. P. McAfee and V. te Velde. Dynamic pricing in the airline industry. In Handbook on
Economics and Information Systems, volume 1, pages 527–570. 2006.
R. B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58–73, 1981.
N. Novemsky and M. E. Schweitzer. What makes negotiators happy? The differential effects of
internal and external social comparisons on negotiator satisfaction. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 95:186–197, 2004.
G. M. Philipps. Interpolation and Approximation by Polynomials. Springer, New York, NY,
USA, 2003.
R. L. Philipps. Why are prices set the way they are? In O¨. O¨zer and R. Phillips, editors, The
Oxford Handbook of Pricing Management. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2012.
T. Popomaronis. Amid preparations for hurricane Irma, Ama-
zon draws scrutiny for price increases. Forbes, September 6,
2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/tompopomaronis/2017/09/06/
hurricane-irma-resulting-in-claims-that-amazon-is-price-gouging-what-we-know.
H. E. Resseguie. Alexander Turney Stewart and the development of the department store,
1823-1876. The Business History Review, 39(3):301–322, 1965.
A. Rubinstein. Beyond matroids: Secretary problem and prophet inequality with general con-
straints. In Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages
324–332, 2016.
A. Rubinstein and S. Singla. Combinatorial prophet inequalities. In Proceedings of the 28th
Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1671–1687, 2017.
A. Schupak. Uber defends surge pricing with NYC study. CBS
News, September 18, 2015. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
uber-defends-surge-pricing-with-nyc-case-study/.
M. E. Snodgrass. The Civil War Era and Reconstruction: An Encyclopedia of Social, Political,
Cultural and Economic History. Routledge, London, UK, 2011.
J. Subramanian, S. Stidham, and C. J. Lautenbacher. Airline yield management with overbook-
ing, cancellations, and no-shows. Transportation Science, 33(2):147–167, 1999.
K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin. The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management. Springer, New
York, NY, USA, 2004.
Q. Yan. Mechanism design via correlation gap. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 710–719, 2011.
24
